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I. INTRODUCTION
In discussing the justice processes used in Indonesia and East Timor to
hold individuals accountable for serious violations of international law com-
mitted in East Timor, it is important to emphasize that the problems are rooted
in politics not the rule of law. Political influence is what I'm going to focus on
because it goes to the core of the problems in Indonesia and East Timor and
provides a painful example of what can happen when a justice process becomes
deeply politicized.
Indonesia is a case study of what can go wrong when a country is pre-
maturely entrusted with the responsibility to try individuals for crimes it is
nowhere close to acknowledging. Indonesia also provides an important
example for the International Criminal Court and the principle of "complemen-
tarity," and the real problems that can be encountered when an offending state
is given first (and perhaps only) crack at prosecuting offenders it really wants
to protect, not prosecute.
And, I'm going to talk about East Timor-a case study of what can happen
when a legal system is created on a rickety foundation, in which genuine politi-
cal will and necessary resources are lacking and make the process vulnerable to
influence and manipulation for broader geo-political interests. East Timor is
also a place where cries for justice from the population are loud-they want
Indonesian leaders to be held accountable, and yet East Timor's political leaders
prefer to override these demands in favor of what they hope will become a
strong economic and political relationship with the country's former occupier.
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At the end of my talk, I would like to have persuaded some of you to
contact the United Nations Secretary-General and to ask him to establish a high-
level international review panel of between three and five judges and interna-
tional law experts to review not what happened in East Timor (the crimes are
well-documented), but to review what did not happen and to make recommen-
dations for redressing these omissions.'
II. BACKGROUND
East Timor occupies half an island; the other half, West Timor, is part of
Indonesia's vast archipelago. East Timor had been a Portuguese colony from
the 16th century but in July 1975, Portugal finally withdrew. Five months later,
on December 7, after months of fighting among various Timorese political
parties, Indonesia launched a full-fledged attack, which resulted in the terri-
tory's occupation by Indonesian forces for the next twenty-four years. East
Timor was and remains almost 95% Catholic and the population speaks a local
language, Tetum, and over thirty very distinct local dialects, but also relies
heavily on Bahasa Indonesian (learned during the occupation).2
During Indonesia's twenty-four-year occupation, as much as one quarter
of East Timor's population of about 800,000 was killed by security forces or
died as a result of starvation or abusive conditions. Torture, rape, disappear-
ances and other forms of degradation and domination were prevalent throughout
the period. The Timorese fought a guerilla war with an underground political
movement aimed at securing its independence.
In 1998, the political tides in Indonesia changed and its longtime authori-
tarian President Suharto resigned May 20, 1998, amid sustained popular and
violent protests. Vice President Habibie was sworn-in the same day and one
month later, he reopened the subject of East Timor by offering to grant it limited
autonomy. This offer quickly led to renewed negotiations between Indonesia
and Portugal (with East Timor's pro-independent movement represented by the
Portuguese delegation), and by late January 1999, President Habibie indicated
that Indonesia would withdraw from East Timor if the people voted against
increased autonomy, in favor of independence. Yet, as political agreements
were being negotiated, the Indonesian security services began to train and equip
local militias to intimidate and terrorize the population.
1. A fax can be sent to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan at 212 963-4879. The
estimated cost for a three-person panel to operate with staff support and travel to the region over a nine-month
period is approximately $700,000.
2. Portuguese and Teturn were adopted as East Timor's official languages following its
independence but as a practical matter, Bahasa Indonesia is widely used. The issue of language has created
tension especially between the ruling elite, many of whom spent substantial time in Portugal or Mozambique
during the occupation and do not speak Bahasa, and the younger generation who do not speak Portuguese.
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On May 5, 1999, a series of three agreements were signed. The first agree-
ment outlined the terms of a popular referendum in which the people of East
Timor could vote for more autonomy within Indonesia, or reject the offer of
autonomy, placing East Timor on the path toward independence.3 A United
Nations presence was contemplated under either outcome to ensure a smooth
transition from the vote to implementation. The second agreement addressed
security concerns and gave Indonesian police sole responsibility for maintaining
law and order while calling on the armed forces and police to maintain
neutrality.4 The third agreement set forth modalities for conducting the vote,
including a referendum target date of August 8, 1999.'
These landmark agreements included a tight timeline for United Nations
action. On June 11, 1999, the Security Council established UNAMET (United
Nations Mission in East Timor) and rapidly deployed a small contingent of
personnel to register voters, ensure the popular referendum would be conducted
in a free and fair manner, and provide an objective assessment of the security
situation.
Security matters were a serious concern and hundreds of East Timorese
were killed as Indonesian security forces formed local militias to intimidate
citizens who favored independence. In 1999, there were two periods of
heightened violence instigated by Indonesian security forces and militias. The
first period began in late January 1999 and culminated in April 1999 before the
May 5 agreements. It was evidenced by murder, torture, rape and displacement.
The second period began right after the referendum vote on August 30 when
violence was at a low, but constant boil for five days. Then on September 4,
1999 when the referendum results were announced and more than 78% of the
population opted for independence, violence exploded. For the next two weeks,
the Indonesian military unleashed its security forces and home-grown East
Timorese militias in an impressively synchronized offensive that United Nations
employees described as nothing short of a "scorched earth" policy.6
3. Agreement Between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on the Question
of East Timor, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port.-U.N., available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreementl
agreeFrame.Eng0l.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
4. East Timor Popular Consultation Agreement Regarding Security, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port.-
U.N., available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrameEngO4.html (last visited Jan.
21, 2004).
5. Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese through
a Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port.-U.N., available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/
agreeFrame-Eng03.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). Voter registration was set back by three weeks due to
security issues at the beginning of the process. This subsequently pushed back the date of the referendum to
Aug. 30, 1999.
6. Indonesia's Scorched Earth Policy Levels East Timor (Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
Sept. 27, 1999), available at http://www.abc.net.auf7.30/stories/s55114.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004);
Associated Press, U.N. Official In E Timor Says World Community Miscalculated, Nov. 18, 1999, available
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By the time the 1999 violence ended, about 80% of the territory's infra-
structure was destroyed, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced
including nearly 200,000 who were pushed across the border into West Timor,
around 1,300 were dead, women had been raped and the entire population was
absolutely terrorized. I first went to East Timor one year later, in September
2000, and I was shocked by the near total destruction of not only the capital Dili
but also other towns and villages I visited. This easily compared to the worst
devastation I saw during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Vukovar and the
frontline areas in Sarajevo and Mostar.
I. ESTABLISHING THE INDONESIAN AD HOC HUMAN RIGHTS COURT
As a result of this gratuitous violence and Indonesia's brutal and retaliatory
actions, there was hot discussion in capitals around the world and among human
rights advocates and lawyers as to how Indonesia could be held to account for
the serious violations of international law perpetrated by its forces and persons
acting under its authority. At that time, the focus was on crimes committed in
1999 when the violence was perceived as an enormous slap to the international
community after, against better judgment the Indonesian military had been
entrusted to do what it said it would do-provide security. At the time, many
talked about establishing another ad hoc international criminal tribunal similar
to those of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to try top-level Indonesian
offenders. However, there was little political appetite. Those Tribunals were
expensive, relatively slow moving, and politically cumbersome to negotiate.
Where, for example, would a Tribunal for East Timor be seated? What would
be its temporal jurisdiction? Would it go back to the time of occupation and
possibly, implicate the United States, or would it go back further to crimes
committed during East Timor's brief civil war and point to individuals now in
positions of power? It was also an election year in the United States and
pushing for an international ad hoc criminal tribunal to try Indonesian generals
would likely have created a political backlash from Indonesia's powerful United
States lobby.
Predictably, the idea of an ad hoc court was not popular with the Indo-
nesian military and political leaders. They said they would not send their
generals to a foreign court and that they could be trusted to try them themselves
along with others responsible for the violence. So, late in 1999 after Indonesia
had withdrawn from East Timor and the United Nations had begun to establish
its mission to help the territory recover and move toward statehood, the
at http://www.etan.orglet99c/november/14-20/18unoffi.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004); Ian Timberlake, The
Man Who Organized the Timor Vote Looks Back With Few Regrets, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 21, 1999;
Marian Wilkinson National Affairs Editor, Exposed: Indonesia's Scorched Earth Plan, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Jan. 31, 2000.
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international community embraced the idea of creating two parallel justice
systems. One, in Indonesia to try high-level Indonesian officials and another in
East Timor, under United Nations-auspices as part of the United Nations'
transitional administration, to focus primarily on East Timorese offenders. It
seemed at the time to be the most viable political solution.
And this could have been a rather elegant solution, given genuine political
will. However, Indonesia was defiant and manipulative all along the way.
Throughout the process, it acted only when pressured and then only did the bare
minimum to deflect pressure until the next time-they took a hide-and-seek
approach to delivering justice. Mostly, Indonesia did the hiding and the inter-
national community did the seeking, but sometimes the international community
hid, too.
First, Indonesia tried to avoid establishing a judicial process all together,
but pressure was applied, and the ad hoc Human Rights Court in Indonesia was
established. Then, the mandate was severely restricted to cover only crimes
committed after August 1999. Again, pressure was applied, and the mandate
was expanded to include two distinct months (April and September) of 1999 and
three municipalities (not all thirteen). One strategy reportedly used by the
Secretary-General with the Indonesians was to tell them that if their process
were a failure there would be more pressure on the United Nations to sponsor
its own tribunal. The underlying message, of course, was for the Indonesians
to do just enough to prevent any momentum from building for another ad hoc
international court.
When Indonesian prosecutors finally issued indictments, eighteen indivi-
duals were charged, including some important military and police commanders,
but notably lacking from the list was General Wiranto, Defense Minister and
Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces during the relevant time (and now
a Presidential candidate).7 His indictment had been anticipated after he was
identified by Komnas-HAM, a governmental human rights body, as being most
responsible for the violence in 1999 in an excellent report issued on January 31,
2000.8 When trials finally began in 2002 there were many problems, among
which, witnesses and judges were intimidated by the presence of military
officers and militia members in the gallery who made menacing comments;
Indonesian prosecutors, some believing that the military were heroes, failed to
present all available evidence; prosecutors often recommended below-minimum
standard sentences; judges were poorly trained, lacked resources and were
unable to exert adequate control in the courtroom.
7. National Journal Group, Ex-Indonesian Military Chief Wiranto Seeks Presidency, U.N. WIRE,
Aug. 7, 2003; Abdul Khalik, Key BNI Suspect Arrested, JAKARTA POST, Nov. 20, 2003.
8. Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific, Indonesian Commission of Investigation into
Human Rights Violations Report, Jan. 31, 2000, http://asia-pacific-action.orglsoutheastasialeasttimor/
resources/reports/comnaset.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
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In the end, the trials also produced a distorted legal record of events. The
official court record portrays the violence in East Timor as a purely East
Timorese conflict in which Indonesia benevolently intervened to separate two
fighting parties. After the first two verdicts were announced in August 2002,
the Secretary-General felt compelled to release a statement and clarify that there
had not, in fact, been irregularities in the United Nations' vote-counting which
Indonesian judges, prosecutors and defendants stated had contributed to the
widespread violence.9 At the same time, the United States also issued a
statement in which it pronounced its disappointment that "prosecutors in these
cases did not fully use the resources and evidence available to them from the
United Nations and elsewhere."1° In the verdicts of the six people charged, five
were acquitted and one was convicted. Those acquitted were all members of
Indonesia's security services, four in the army and one in the police. The
conviction was of the former civilian governor of East Timor, Abiio Soares,
who himself was Timorese, not Indonesian. He was sentenced to three years for
murder and persecution as crimes against humanity.
Of the eighteen individuals tried by the Indonesian Human Rights Court,
twelve were acquitted, and six convicted with shockingly low sentences. All
convicted remain free pending appeal even though only one has actually filed
an appeal. The last trial resulted in the three-year sentence of General Damiri
who at the time oversaw all military operations for East Timor from his base in
Bali. Not only did the prosecution recommend he be acquitted but he missed
four consecutive hearings during his trial-he was busy with other matters.
Where? In Aceh province, where he was overseeing the government's brutal
clampdown on pro-independence supporters.1 2 He, too, remains free pending
an appeal, which has not been filed.
9. Press Release, U.N. News, Anna Speaks Out Against Allegations of Irregularities in U.N.-
Backed East Timor Vote, Aug. 25, 2002, available at http://www.unnews.co.kr/pdf/pd_01 1/0111 .pdf (last
visited Jan. 21, 2004); Press Release, U.N. News, Secretary-General Endorses Human Rights Commissioner's
Concerns Over Indonesia Tribunal (Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/
sgsm8338.doc.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
10. Reuters, U.S. Criticizes Prosecutors in East Timor Trial, Aug. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/20_8_02.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
11. Five indicted for Suai Church massacre, Herman Sedyono, Lieutenant Colonel former Bupati
(District Chief) of Covalima District; Liliek Kushadianto, Lieutenant Colonol former commander Suai District
Military Command; Ahmad Syamsudin, Captain and former chief-of-staff of Suai District Military Command;
Sugito, Lieutenant and former Commander of Suai Military Sector Command; Colonel Gatot Subiyaktoro,
Lieutenant and former police chief of Suai; see International Center for Transitional Justice, Intended to Fail:
The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta: app. 1, http://www.ictj.org/downloads/
intendedtofailwithannexes--final.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
12. Indonesian General on Aceh Duty Again Skips His Trial for Rights Abuses, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, May 22, 2003; LaksamanaNet, White Flag from Prosecutors, June 8, 2003, available at
http://www.laksamana.net/print.cfm?id=5507 (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
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IV. THE SPECIAL PANELS IN EAST TIMOR
I am reluctant to be too critical of the East Timorese judicial process
because for a long time it seemed like a hopeful and novel approach to resolving
some of the tough issues, and there have been some very dedicated people
working to ensure the process moved ahead and victims were heard. Two years
ago I would have been extremely upbeat, today I am less so. But there is some
good news coming out of the trial process in East Timor although the people of
East Timor are still far from achieving the justice they deeply desire and
deserve.
Despite being chronically under-resourced, the prosecution unit set up in
East Timor under United Nations direction has accomplished a lot in its short
and difficult life. As of December 2003, the Unit has filed 81 indictments with
the Special Panels charging a total of 369 people. Of those indicted, 281
accused remain at large and are presumed to be in Indonesia, including across
the border in West Timor. Forty-six accused have been convicted and sentenced
to terms ranging between four and thirty-four years, one has been acquitted. 3
In October 1999, the United Nations established its transitional administra-
tion to help East Timor on its way toward independence (which it declared in
May 2002). In March 2000, the United Nations' mission in East Timor passed
a regulation that listed crimes over which the District Court in Dili, East
Timor's capital, would have exclusive jurisdiction. It listed genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and certain "ordinary" crimes (namely murder,
sexual offenses and torture).
The Regulation stipulated that special panels of judges, composed of both
East Timorese and international judges, could be established to hear these cases.
It also clarified that forming such panels did not preclude the jurisdiction of an
international tribunal for East Timor in the event such a tribunal was estab-
lished.
Three months later, in June 2000, the Special Panels were formed. They
are composed of one East Timorese and two international judges. There are
now two such panels and they have jurisdiction to try the serious crimes
mentioned above committed prior to October 25, 1999, the date the United
Nations' mission was established.
The temporal jurisdiction of the panels is an example of one-way
accountability efforts in East Timor have been undermined. While the panels
have the authority to look back at crimes committed before October 25, 1999,
the prosecution unit has repeatedly focused on crimes committed solely in 1999,
claiming it only has jurisdiction over this period. The United Nations' hired
13. Tim Alfa Militiamen Found Not Guilty of 1999 Murder of Los Palos King but Convicted of
Violence Against Property or Persons U.N. Serious Crimes Unit Press Release, (Dec. 15, 2003) (on file with
author).
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personnel in the Unit decided early on that it would investigate ten priority cases
focusing on serious events that occurred in 1999. In 2003, the Unit completed
its investigations and indictments on these cases. But rather than pursuing some
of the pre-1999 cases, the Unit has now busied itself with indicting crimes that
occurred in every district in 1999, regrettably ensuring it has no time or
resources to look back in time.
The Unit estimates that 1,300 people were killed in 1999 and that at least
one individual could be indicted for each murder. But to what end? What, in
fact is the purpose of indicting hundreds of individuals if a serious effort is not
made to ensure they end up in custody? This has been another anomaly to the
process in East Timor. Even though the United Nations' transitional administra-
tor for East Timor managed early on to secure a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Indonesian government to cooperate with the Unit and to
extradite people to East Timor, no pressure was ever applied and the MOU
became meaningless after the first United Nations mandate expired at the time
East Timor gained its independence.
In February 2003, the prosecution received its biggest disappointment
when, after years of work, it issued its highest-level indictment against eight
top-ranking Indonesians, including General Wiranto."4 Of those indicted, five
had been nominally prosecuted in Indonesia's ad hoc Human Rights Court,
including two who were acquitted and three who were sentenced to between
three and five years by the Indonesian court. The United Nations immediately
distanced itself saying it was not a United Nations' indictment but one issued
by the East Timorese government.
The Unit was devastated by this response, since the Secretary-General him-
self in April 2002, just ten months earlier, in his report to the Security Council
stated that the Serious Crimes Unit would "focus its investigations on ten
priority cases and on those persons who had organized, ordered, instigated or
otherwise aided in the planning, preparation and execution of the crimes." 5
14. In addition to General Wiranto, the following individuals were indicted by the Serious Crimes
Unit on Feb. 24, 2003: Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim, Head of Special Team of the Indonesian
Armed Forces (TNI); Major General Kiki Syahnakri, Commander of the Martial Law Operations Command
in East Timor; Major General Adam Rachmat Damiri, Commander of the Regional Military Command IX
covering East Timor, Colonel Suhartono Suratman, Commander of the Sub-Regional Military Command 164
in East Timor until Aug. 13, 1999, Colonel Mohammad Noer MUIS, Commander of the Sub-Regional
Military Command 164 in East Timor from Aug. 13 1999, Lt. Colonel Yayat Sudrajat, Commander of the
Tribuana VIII Task Force and Commander of the Intelligence Task Force Sub-Regional Military Command
164 in East Timor, Governor Abilio Jose Osorio Soares, Governor of East Timor; see East Timor Action
Network, Crimes Against Humanity Charges for Former Indonesian Minister of Defense, Top Indonesian
Military Commanders and East Timor Governor, Feb. 25, 2003, available at http://www.etan.org/et2003/
february/23-28/28info.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
15. Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor, U.N. SCOR, S/2002/432, at 12 (Apr. 17, 2002).
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Given the clarity of this statement it was a surprise to the Unit, the East
Timorese government and those of us advocating justice for East Timor, when
the Secretary-General's office backed away from its previous support.
Despite its best efforts, there are several indications that the Unit has con-
tinued to face tremendous political pressure from the United Nations, friendly
governments, Indonesia and even the East Timorese government, to curb the
Unit's work. Being a United Nations-established and United Nations-supported
body it relies entirely on allocations made to it. The United Nations' current
mandate expires in May 2004 and discussions are underway about the level to
which the Unit will continue to receive support. In October 2003, it appeared
almost certain the mandate of the Prosecution section and judges panels would
be extended. It is less clear now.
V. CONCLUSION
Indonesia and East Timor have a lot to teach us about how things can get
off track if political interests trump the genuine desire to uncover the truth and
hold individuals accountable for serious international crimes. The same poten-
tial for abuse and manipulation exists within the International Criminal Court,
which relies heavily on the principle of "complementarity," the principle that
gives States first chance to investigate and prosecute individuals believed to be
responsible for serious violations of international law. Holding such trials is
difficult under any circumstances, but it is particularly difficult for countries
emerging from years of bitter-armed conflict and oppression.
It is critical that no one hide behind a country's promises if there is no
reason to believe the promise is being made in good faith. It is not difficult to
judge sincerity-actions do speak louder than words. No one was surprised that
Indonesia made a mockery of the justice process it established but you will still
find people who say, "but we cannot really judge the process until all the
appeals have been completed." Well, what if the appeals are never filed, should
we continue to deceive ourselves into believing for the next five, ten, fifteen
years that Indonesia is on the brink of making good on its broken promises? 16
Misplaced trust in such circumstances is damaging on multiple levels. There is
a real fear that half-measures in justice only sow the seeds of future dissent by
producing a false historic record and creating deep-seated resentment and anger
16. On December 2, 2003, the South China Morning Post reported that Eurico Guterres, head of the
notorious Aitarak militia in East Timor, had recently formed a militia in Papua despite his 10-year conviction
by the Indonesian ad hoc Human Rights Court. Following his conviction, he has remained free pending an
appeal, which has not been filed. Further, the article revealed that Timbul Silaen, former Indonesian chief of
police in East Timor in 1999 whose acquittal by the Jakarta court was widely criticized, will head up the police
in Papua, replacing outgoing police chief, Budi Utomo. See Marianne Kearney, Timor's Guterres Forms
Papua Militia, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 2, 2003, available at http://iiasnt.leidenuniv.nl:8080/
DR/2003/12/DR_2003_12_03/2 (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
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among the victimized populations. Serbia is a good example. Policy makers
currently point to Serbia as a perfect candidate for national trials, yet neither the
government, nor its citizens are yet willing to acknowledge any serious level of
responsibility for the wars that tore-through that region in the 1990's.
Such actions also undermine confidence (including investor confidence)
in not only a country's legal system but in its political system and in its ability
to deal fairly and create a stable environment over the long-term.
To try to offset some of the damage done in Indonesia and East Timor,
there is a push, as I mentioned at the beginning, to create a high-level review
commission comprised of between three and five judges and international law
experts to review the legal processes employed in Indonesia and East Timor.
It was an effort initiated here in New York by the International Center for
Transitional Justice, Human Rights Watch, Etan, Amnesty International and
others working with Sergio de Mello, East Timor's first transitional administra-
tor, who was also guiding this process. Since his unfortunate death in Iraq, the
effort to form the commission has moved to the Secretary-General's Office, but
it has not been received energetically.
Frankly, evidence indicates that the Secretary-General and many other
political leaders, including the United States administration, would like to see
justice for East Timor and Indonesia taken off the table especially given the war
on terrorism and Indonesia's important role in that fight. We must ensure this
does not happen. It is challenging to weigh immediate political exigencies with
the long-term commitment required in seeing through a justice process. Hold-
ing abusers accountable for serious violations of international law has become
a tool political leaders can use. Once employed, there must be a long-term and
steady commitment to seeing the process through-anything short, sends a
confusing message and provides an opportunity for hardliners to undermine the
peace process, obfuscate the truth, and ultimately create future instability.
In one of Judge Patricia Wald's cases before the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, she eloquently warned that "pragmatism should
not be allowed to trump principle or the soul of a nation will wither."' 7 Here I
believe we are considering the essence of international justice and the risk of
undermining its credibility over the long-term by politicizing the process. The
United Nations sees a role in justice for itself in the future but the organization
must do right by the processes it has already begun in order to ensure a solid
foundation is established upon which we can build with confidence.
17. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
